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Abstract
In Feferman’s work, explicit mathematics and theories of generalized inductive definitions play a cen-
tral role. One objective of this article is to describe the connections with Martin-Lo¨f type theory and
constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Proof theory has contributed to a deeper grasp of the rela-
tionship between different frameworks for constructive mathematics. Some of the reductions are known
only through ordinal-theoretic characterizations. The paper also addresses the strength of Voevodsky’s
univalence axiom.
A further goal is to investigate the strength of intuitionistic theories of generalized inductive definitions
in the framework of intuitionistic explicit mathematics that lie beyond the reach of Martin-Lo¨f type
theory.
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1 Introduction
Intuitionistic systems of inductive definitions have figured prominently in Solomon Feferman’s program of
reducing classical subsystems of analysis and theories of iterated inductive definitions to constructive theories
of various kinds. In the special case of classical theories of finitely as well as transfinitely iterated inductive
definitions, where the iteration occurs along a computable well-ordering, the program was mainly completed
by Buchholz, Pohlers, and Sieg more than 30 years ago (see [13, 19]). For stronger theories of inductive
definitions such as those based on Feferman’s intutitionic Explicit Mathematics1 (Ti0) some answers have
been provided in the last 10 years while some questions are still open.
The aim of the first part of this paper is to survey the landscape of some prominent constructive theories that
emerged in the 1970s. In addition to Feferman’s Ti0, Myhill’s Constructive Set Theory (CST) and Martin-
Lo¨f type theory (MLTT) have been proposed with the aim of isolating the principles on which constructive
mathematics is founded, notably the notions of constructive function and set in Bishop’s mathematics.
Martin-Lo¨f type theory with infinitely many universes and inductive types (W-types) has attracted a great
deal of attention recently because of a newly found connection between type theory and topology, called
homotopy type theory (HoTT), where types are interpreted as spaces, terms as maps and the inhabitants
of the iterated identity types on a given type A are viewed as paths, homotopies and higher homotopies of
increasing levels, respectively, endowing each type with a weak ω-groupoid structure.
Homotopy type theory, so it appears, has now reached the mathematical mainstream:
1Feferman introduced the theory of explicit mathematics in [20]. There it was based on intuitionistic logic and notated by
T0. The same notation is used e.g. in [13, 34, 48] but increasingly T0 came to be identified with its classical version. As a
result, we adopt the notation Ti
0
to stress its intuitionistic basis and reserve T0 for the classical theory.
1
Voevodsky’s Univalent Foundations require not just one inaccessible cardinal but an infinite string
of cardinals, each inaccessible from its predecessor. (M. Harris, Mathematics without apologies,
2015).
By Univalent Foundations Harris seems to refer to MLTT plus Voevodsky’s Univalence Axiom (UA). To
set the stage for the latter axiom, let us recall a bit of history of extensionality and universes in type
theory. Simple type theory, as formulated by A. Church in 1940 [16], already provides a natural and elegant
alternative to set theory for representing mathematics in a formal way. The stratification of mathematical
objects into the types of propositions, individuals and functions between two types is indeed quite natural.
In this setup, the axiom of extensionality comes in two forms: the stipulation that two logically equivalent
propositions are equal and the stipulation that two pointwise equal functions are equal. Some restrictions of
expressiveness encountered in simple type theory are overcome by dependent type theory, yet still unnatural
limitations remain in that one cannot express the notion of an arbitrary structure in this framework. For
instance one cannot assign a type to an arbitrary field. Type theory (and other frameworks as well) solve
this issue by introducing the notion of a universe type. Whereas most types come associated with a germane
axiom of extensionality inherited from its constituent types following the example of simple type theory, it
is by no means clear what kind of extensionality principle should govern universes. A convincing proposal
was missing until the work of V. Voevodsky with its formulation of the extensionality axiom for universes in
terms of equivalences. This is the univalence axiom, which generalizes propositional extensionality.
Harris’s claim that an infinite sequence of inaccessible cardinals is required to modelMLTT plus Voevodsky’s
Univalence Axiom is a pretty strong statement. Recent research by Bezem, Huber, and Coquand (see [10]),
though, indicates thatMLTT+UA has an interpretation inMLTT and therefore is proof-theoretically not
stronger than MLTT. But what is the strength of MLTT? As there doesn’t seem to exist much common
knowledge among type theorists about the strength of various systems and how they relate to the other
constructive frameworks as well as classical theories used as a classification hierarchy in reverse mathematics
and set theory, it seems reasonable to devote a section to mapping out the relationships and gathering current
knowledge in one place. In this section attention will also be payed to the methods employed in proofs such
as interpretations but with a particular eye toward the role of ordinal analysis therein.
The second part of this paper (Section 8) will be concerned with extensions of explicit mathematics by
principles that allow the construction of inductive classifications that lie way beyond MLTT’s reach but
still have a constructive flavor. The basic theory here is intuitionistic explicit mathematics Ti0. In T
i
0 one
can freely talk about monotone operations on classifications and assert the existence of least fixed points
of such operators. There are two ways in which one can add a principle to Ti0 postulating the existence of
least fixed points. MID merely existentially asserts that every monotone operation has a least fixed point
whereas UMID not only postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new functional
constant to the language, ensures that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone
operation.
The question of the strength of systems of explicit mathematics with MID and UMID was raised by
Feferman in [22]; we quote:
What is the strength of T0+MID? [...] I have tried, but did not succeed, to extend my interpre-
tation of T0 in Σ
1
2 − AC + BI to include the statement MID. The theory T0 +MID includes
all constructive formulations of iteration of monotone inductive definitions of which I am aware,
while T0 (in its IG axiom) is based squarely on the general iteration of accessibility inductive
definitions. Thus it would be of great interest for the present subject to settle the relationship
between these theories. (p. 88)
As it turned out, the principles MID and even more UMID encapsulate considerable strength, when
considered on the basis of classicalT0. For instance T0+UMID embodies the strength of Π
1
2-comprehension.
The first (significant) models of T0 +MID were found by Takahashi [69]. Research on the precise strength
was conducted by Rathjen[56, 57, 58] and Glaß, Rathjen, Schlu¨ter [26]. The article [59] provides a survey of
the classical case. Tupailo [71] obtained the first result in the intuitionistic setting. This and further results
will be the topic of section 3.
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2 Some Background on Feferman’s Ti0
The theory of explicit mathematics, here denoted by Ti0, is a formal framework that has great expressive
power. It is suitable for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics as well as generalized recur-
sion, including direct expression of structural concepts which admit self-application. Feferman was led to
the development of his explicit mathematics when trying to understand what Errett Bishop had achieved
in his groundbreaking constructive redevelopment of analysis in [11]. For a detailed account see [20, 21].
The ontology behind the axioms of Ti0 is that the universe of mathematical objects is populated by (a)
natural numbers, (b) operations (in general partial) and (c) classifications (akin to Bishop’s sets) where
operations and classifications are to be understood as given intensionally. Operations can be applied to any
object including operations and classifications; they are governed by axioms giving them the structure of
a partial combinatory algebra (also known as applicative structures or Scho¨nfinkel algebras). There are, for
example, operations that act on classifications X,Y to produce their Cartesian product X × Y and expo-
nential XY . The formation of classifications is governed by the Join, Inductive Generation and Elementary
Comprehension Axiom.
The language of Ti0, L(T
i
0), has two sorts of variables. The free and bound variables (a, b, c, . . . and x, y, z . . .)
are conceived to range over the whole constructive universe which comprises operations and classifications
among other kinds of entities; while upper-case versions of these A,B,C, ... and X,Y, Z, ... are used to
represent free and bound classification variables.
N is a classification constant taken to define the class of natural numbers. 0 , sN and pN are operation
constants whose intended interpretations are the natural number 0 and the successor and predecessor opera-
tions. Additional operation constants are k, s, d, p, p1 and p1 for the two basic combinators, definition by
cases on N, pairing and the corresponding two projections. Additional classification constants are generated
using the axioms and the constants j, i and cn(n < ω) for join, induction and comprehension.
There is no arity associated with the various constants. The terms of Ti0 are just the variables and constants
of the two sorts. The atomic formulae of Ti0 are built up using the terms and three primitive relation symbols
=, App and ε as follows. If q, r, r1, r2 are terms, then q = r, App(q, r1, r2), and q ε r (where r has to be a
classification variable or constant) are atomic formulae. App(q, r1, r2) expresses that the operation q applied
to r1 yields the value r2; q ε r asserts
2 that q is in r or that q is classified under r.
We write t1t2 ≃ t3 for App(t1, t2, t3).
The set of formulae is then obtained from these using the propositional connectives and the two quantifiers
of each sort.
In order to facilitate the formulation of the axioms, the language of Ti0 is expanded definitionally with the
symbol ≃ and the auxiliary notion of an application term is introduced. The set of application terms is given
by two clauses:
1. all terms of Ti0 are application terms; and
2. if s and t are application terms, then (st) is an application term.
If s is an application term and u is a bound or free variable we define s ≃ u by induction on the buildup of
s:
s ≃ u is
{
s = u, if s is a variable or a constant,
∃x, y[s1 ≃ x ∧ s2 ≃ y ∧ App(x, y, u] if s is an application term (s1s2)
For s and t application terms, we have auxiliary, defined formulae of the form:
s ≃ t := ∀y(s ≃ y ↔ t ≃ y).
Some abbreviations are t1 . . . tn for ((...(t1t2)...)tn); t ↓ for ∃y(t ≃ y) and φ(t) for ∃y(t ≃ y ∧ φ(y)).
Go¨del numbers for formulae play a key role in the axioms introducing the classification constants cn. A
formula is said to be elementary if it contains only free occurrences of classification variables A (i.e., only
2It should be pointed out that we use the symbol “ε” instead of “∈” deliberately, the latter being reserved for the set–theoretic
elementhood relation.
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as parameters), and even those free occurrences of A are restricted: A must occur only to the right of
ε in atomic formulas. The Go¨del number cn above is the Go¨del number of an elementary formula. We
assume that a standard Go¨del numbering numbering has been chosen for L(Ti0); if φ is an elementary
formula and a, b1, . . . , bm, A1, . . . , An is a list of variables which includes all parameters of φ, then {x :
φ(x, b1, . . . , bn, A1, . . . , An)} stands for cn(b1, . . . , bn, A1, . . . , An); n is the code of the pair of Go¨del numbers
〈pφq, p(a, b1, . . . , bm, A1, . . . , An)q〉 and is called the ‘index’ of φ and the list of variables.
Some further conventions are useful. Systematic notation for n-tuples is introduced as follows: (t) is t, (s, t)
is pst, and (t1, . . . , tn) is defined by ((t1, . . . , tn−1), tn). Finally, t
′ is written for the term sNt, and ⊥ is the
elementary formula 0 ≃ 0′.
Ti0’s logic is intuitionistic two-sorted predicate logic with identity. Its non-logical axioms are:
I. Basic Axioms
1. ∀X∃x(X = x)
2. App(a, b, c1) ∧ App(a, b, c2) → c1 = c2
II. App Axioms
1. (kab) ↓ ∧ kab ≃ a,
2. (sab) ↓ ∧ sabc ≃ ac(bc),
3. (pa1a2) ↓ ∧ (p1a) ∧ (p2a) ↓ ∧ pi(pa1a2) ≃ ai for i = 0, 1,
4. (c1 = c2 ∨ c1 6= c2) ∧ (dabc1c2) ↓ ∧ (c1 = c2 → dabc1c2 ≃ a) ∧ (c1 6= c2 → dabc1c2 ≃ b),
5. a ε N ∧ b ε N→ [a′ ↓ ∧ p0(a′) ≃ a ∧ ¬(a′ ≃ 0) ∧ (a′ ≃ b′ → a ≃ b)].
III. Classification Axioms
Elementary Comprehension Axiom (ECA)
∃X [X ≃ {x : ψ(x)} ∧ ∀x(x ε X ↔ ψ(x))]
for each elementary formula ψa, which may contain additional parameters.
Natural Numbers
(i) 0 εN ∧ ∀x(x εN→ x′ εN)
(ii) φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x) → φ(x′))→ (∀x εN)φ(x) for each formula φ of L(Ti0).
Join (J)
∀x ε A∃Y fx ≃ Y → ∃X [X ≃ j(A, f) ∧ ∀z(z ε X ↔ ∃xεA∃y(z ≃ (x, y) ∧ y ε fx))]
Inductive Generation (IG)
∃X [X ≃ i(A,B) ∧ ∀x ε A[∀y[(y, x) ε B → y ε X ]→ x ε X ]
∧ [∀x ε A [∀y ((y, x) ε B → φ(y))→ φ(x)]→ ∀x ε X φ(x)]]
where φ is an arbitrary formula of Ti0.
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3 Type theories
The type theory of Martin-Lo¨f from the 1984 book [42] will be notated byMLTText where the superscript is
meant to convey that this is an extensional theory. It has all the usual type constructors Π,Σ,+,0,1,2, Id,W
for dependent products, dependent sums, disjoint unions, empty type, unit type, Booleans, propositional
identity types, and W-types, respectively. Moreover, the system comprises a sequence of universe types
U0,U1,U2, . . . externally indexed by the natural numbers. The universe types are closed under the type
constructors from the first list and they form a cumulative hierarchy in that Un is a type in Un+1 and if A
is a type in Un then A is also a type in Un+1.
In the version of [42] the identity type was taken to be extensional whereas in the more recent versions, e.g.
[45] and the one forming the basis for homotopy type theory (see [33]), it is considered to be intensional.
The intensional version will simply be denoted by MLTT. For the proof-theoretic strength, though, it
turns out that the difference is immaterial. The reasons will be explained below, but perhaps a first good
approximation comes from the observation that (exact) lower bounds can be established by interpreting
certain set theories in type theory in such a way that the extensional identity type can be dispensed with
in these interpretations, although for validating certain forms of the axiom of choice, e.g. the ΠΣW-AC
axiom to be discussed below, chunks of extensionality are still required. Since we shall be discussing (partial)
conservativity results of extensional over intensional type theory below, let’s recall the differences.
Definition 3.1 A key feature of Martin-Lo¨f’s type theory is the distinction of two notions of identity (or
equality). Judgemental identity appears in judgements in the two forms Γ ⊢ s = t : A and Γ ⊢ A =
B type between terms and between types, respectively. The general equality rules (reflexivity, symmetry,
transitivity) and substitution rules, simultaneously at the level of terms and types, apply to these judgements
as further inference rules.3 But there is also propositional identity which gives rise to types Id(A, s, t) and
allows for internal reasoning about identity.
The rules for the extensional identity type are the following:4
(Id–Formation)
Γ ⊢ A type Γ ⊢ a : A Γ ⊢ b : A
Γ ⊢ Id(A, a, b) type
(Id–Introduction)
Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ refl(a) : Id(A, a, a)
(Id–Uniqueness)
Γ ⊢ p : Id(A, a, b)
Γ ⊢ p = refl(a) : Id(A, a, b)
(Id–Reflection)
Γ ⊢ p : Id(A, a, b)
Γ ⊢ a = b : A
.
Reflection has the effect of rendering judgemental identity undecidable, i.e., the (type checking) questions
whether Γ ⊢ a = b : A or Γ ⊢ a : A hold become undecidable. On the other hand, the set-theoretic models
and many recursion-theoretic models of type theory (see [6, 8, 48]) validate extensionality, lending it an
intuitive appeal.
For the intensional identity type, the foregoing rules of formation and introduction are retained, however,
uniqueness and reflection are jettisoned, getting replaced by elimination and equality rules which are moti-
vated by Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibility, namely that identical elements are those that satisfy the same
properties. Though instead of capturing identity by quantifying (impredicatively) over all properties (as in
3See [45, Ch.5] or [33, A.2.2], where they are called structural rules.
4The rules are essentially the ones used in [42], except that [42] has a constant r as the sole canonical element of all inhabited
types Id(A, a, b). Here we use refl(a) to make the comparison with the intensional case more transparent. In [42], Id–Uniqueness
and Id–Reflection are called I-equality and I-elimination, respectively.
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Principia), the entire family of identity types (Id(A, x, y))x,y :A is viewed as being inductively generated with
sole constructor refl (see [45, 33]). The elimination and equality rules are the following:
(Id–Elimination)
Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ ⊢ b : A
Γ ⊢ c : Id(A, a, b)
Γ, x : A, y : A, z : Id(A, x, y) ⊢ C(x, y, z) type
Γ, x : A ⊢ d(x) : C(x, x, refl(x))
Γ ⊢ J(c, d) : C(a, b, c)
(Id–Equality)
Γ ⊢ a : A
Γ, x : A, y : A, z : Id(A, x, y) ⊢ C(x, y, z) type
Γ, x : A ⊢ d(x) : C(x, x, refl(x))
Γ ⊢ J(refl(a), d) = d(a) : C(a, a, refl(a)) .
An immediate consequence of these rules is the indiscernibility of identical elements expressed as follows.
For every family (C(x))x :A of types there is a function
f : Πx,y :AΠp : Id(A,x,y)[C(x)→ C(y)]
such that with 1C(x) being the function u 7→ u on C(x) we have f(x, x, refl(x)) = 1C(x).
Foregoing extensional identity and using the induction principle encapsulated in Id-elimination and Id-equality
in its stead, is crucial to the more subtle homotopy interpretations of type theory.
4 Constructive set theories
Constructive Set Theory was introduced by Myhill in a seminal paper [44], where a specific axiom system
CST was introduced. Through developing constructive set theory he wanted to isolate the principles un-
derlying Bishop’s conception of what sets and functions are, and he wanted “these principles to be such as
to make the process of formalization completely trivial, as it is in the classical case” ([44], p. 347). Myhill’s
CST was subsequently modified by Aczel and the resulting theory was called Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel
set theory, CZF. A hallmark of this theory is that it possesses a type-theoretic interpretation (cf. [2, 5]).
Specifically, CZF has a scheme called Subset Collection Axiom (which is a generalization of Myhill’s Expo-
nentiation Axiom) whose formalization was directly inspired by the type-theoretic interpretation.
The language of CZF is the same first order language as that of classical Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, ZF
whose only non-logical symbol is ∈. The logic of CZF is intuitionistic first order logic with equality. Among
its non-logical axioms are Extensionality, Pairing and Union in their usual forms. CZF has additionally
axiom schemata which we will now proceed to summarize. Below ∅ stands for the empty set and v + 1
denotes v ∪ {v}. A set-theoretic formula is said to be restricted or bounded or ∆0 if it is constructed from
prime formulae using ¬,∧,∨,→ and only restricted quantifiers ∀x∈y, ∃x∈y.
Infinity:5
∃x [∀u
(
u∈x↔
(
∅ = u ∨ ∃v∈x u = v + 1
))
∧ ∀z (∅ ∈ z ∧ ∀y ∈ z y + 1 ∈ z → x ⊆ z)].
Set Induction: For all formulae φ,
∀x[∀y ∈ xφ(y)→ φ(x)] → ∀xφ(x).
5This axiom asserts the existence of a unique set usually called ω. Note that the second conjunct in [. . .] entails the usual
induction principle for ω with regard to set properties (or equivalently ∆0 formulae).
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Restricted or Bounded Separation: For all restricted formulae φ,
∀a∃b∀x[x ∈ b↔ x ∈ a ∧ φ(x)].
Strong Collection: For all formulae φ,
∀a
[
∀x ∈ a∃yφ(x, y) → ∃b [∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b φ(x, y) ∧ ∀y ∈ b ∃x ∈ a φ(x, y)]
]
.
Subset Collection: For all formulae ψ,
∀a∀b∃c∀u
[
∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b ψ(x, y, u) →
∃d ∈ c [∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ dψ(x, y, u) ∧ ∀y ∈ d ∃x ∈ aψ(x, y, u)]
]
.
The Subset Collection schema easily qualifies as the most intricate axiom of CZF.
We shall also consider an additional axiom that holds true in the type-theoretic interpretation of Aczel if the
type theory is equipped with W -types. To introduce it, we need the notion of a regular set. The formula in
the language of CZF defining the property of a set A that it is regular states that A is transitive, and for
every a ∈ A and set R ⊆ a×A if ∀x ∈ a ∃y (〈x, y〉 ∈ R), then there is a set b ∈ A such that
∀x ∈ a ∃y ∈ b (〈x, y〉 ∈ R) ∧ ∀y ∈ b ∃x ∈ a (〈x, y〉 ∈ R).
In particular, if R : a→ A is a function, then the image of R is an an element of A. Let Reg(A) denote this
assertion. With this auxiliary definition we can state the
Regular Extension Axiom REA
∀x∃y[x ⊆ y ∧ Reg(y)] .
4.1 The axiom of choice in constructive set theories
Among the axioms of set theory, the axiom of choice is distinguished by the fact that it is the only one
that one finds mentioned in workaday mathematics. In the mathematical world of the beginning of the 20th
century, discussions about the status of the axiom of choice were important. In 1904 Zermelo proved that
every set can be well-ordered by employing the axiom of choice. While Zermelo argued that it was self-
evident, it was also criticized as an excessively non-constructive principle by some of the most distinguished
analysts of the day, notably Borel, Baire, and Lebesgue. At first blush this reaction against the axiom of
choice utilized in Cantor’s new theory of sets is surprising as the French analysts had used and continued
to use choice principles routinely in their work. However, in the context of 19th century classical analysis
only the Axiom of Dependent Choices, DC, is invoked and considered to be natural, while the full axiom of
choice is unnecessary and even has some counterintuitive consequences.
Unsurprisingly, the axiom of choice does not have a unambiguous status in constructive mathematics either.
On the one hand it is said to be an immediate consequence of the constructive interpretation of the quantifiers.
Any proof of ∀x∈A∃y∈B φ(x, y) must yield a function f : A → B such that ∀x∈Aφ(x, f(x)). This is
certainly the case in Martin-Lo¨f’s intuitionistic theory of types. On the other hand, it has been observed
that the full axiom of choice cannot be added to systems of extensional constructive set theory without
yielding constructively unacceptable cases of excluded middle (see [18]). In extensional intuitionistic set
theories, a proof of a statement ∀x∈A∃y ∈B φ(x, y), in general, provides only a function F , which when
fed a proof p witnessing x∈A, yields F (p)∈B and φ(x, F (p)). Therefore, in the main, such an F cannot be
rendered a function of x alone. Choice will then hold over sets which have a canonical proof function, where
a constructive function h is a canonical proof function for A if for each x∈A, h(x) is a constructive proof
that x∈A. Such sets having natural canonical proof functions “built-in” have been called bases (cf. [70], p.
841).
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Some constructive choice principles In many a text on constructive mathematics, axioms of countable
choice and dependent choices are accepted as constructive principles. This is, for instance, the case in
Bishop’s constructive mathematics (cf. [11]) as well as Brouwer’s intuitionistic analysis (cf. [70], Ch. 4, Sect.
2). Myhill also incorporated these axioms in his constructive set theory [44].
The weakest constructive choice principle we shall consider is the Axiom of Countable Choice, ACω, i.e.
whenever F is a function with domain ω such that ∀i∈ω ∃y∈F (i), then there exists a function f with
domain ω such that ∀i∈ω f(i)∈F (i).
A mathematically very useful axiom to have in set theory is the Dependent Choices Axiom, DC, i.e., for all
formulae ψ, whenever
(∀x∈ a) (∃y ∈ a)ψ(x, y)
and b0 ∈ a, then there exists a function f : ω → a such that f(0) = b0 and
(∀n∈ω)ψ(f(n), f(n+ 1)).
Even more useful is the Relativized Dependent Choices Axiom, RDC. It asserts that for arbitrary formulae
φ and ψ, whenever
∀x
[
φ(x) → ∃y
(
φ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y)
)]
and φ(b0), then there exists a function f with domain ω such that f(0) = b0 and
(∀n∈ω)
[
φ(f(n)) ∧ ψ(f(n), f(n+ 1))
]
.
In addition to the “traditional” axioms of choice stated above, the interpretation of set theory in type theory
validates several new choice principles which are are not well known. To state them we need to introduce
various operations on classes.
Remark 4.1 LetCZFExp denote the modification ofCZF with Eponentiation in place of Subset Collection.
In almost all the results of this paper, CZF could be replaced by CZFExp, that is to say, for the purposes of
this paper it is enough to assume Exponentiation rather than Subset Collection. However, in what follows
we shall not point this out again.
Definition 4.2 (CZF) If A is a set and Bx are classes for all x ∈ A, we define a class
∏
x∈ABx by:∏
x∈A
Bx := {f | f : A→
⋃
x∈A
Bx ∧ ∀x∈A(f(x) ∈ Bx)}. (1)
If A is a class and Bx are classes for all x ∈ A, we define a class
∑
x∈ABx by:∑
x∈A
Bx := {〈x, y〉 | x ∈ A ∧ y ∈ Bx}. (2)
If A is a class and a, b are sets, we define a class I(A, a, b) by:
I(A, a, b) := {z ∈ 1 | a = b ∧ a, b ∈ A}. (3)
If A is a class and for each a ∈ A, Ba is a set, then
Wa∈ABa
is the smallest class Y such that whenever a ∈ A and f : Ba → Y , then 〈a, f〉 ∈ Y .
Lemma 4.3 (CZF) If A,B,a,b are sets and Bx is a set for all x ∈ A, then
∏
x∈ABx,
∑
x∈ABx and I(A, a, b)
are sets.
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Proof. [55, Lemma 2.5]. ⊓⊔
In the following we shall introduce several inductively defined classes, and, moreover, we have to ensure that
such classes can be formalized in CZF.
We define an inductive definition to be a class of ordered pairs. If Φ is an inductive definition and 〈x, a〉 ∈ Φ
then we write
x
a
Φ
and call x
a
an (inference) step of Φ, with set x of premisses and conclusion a. For any class Y , let
ΓΦ(Y ) =
{
a | ∃x
(
x ⊆ Y ∧
x
a
Φ
)}
.
The class Y is Φ-closed if ΓΦ(Y ) ⊆ Y . Note that Γ is monotone; i.e. for classes Y1, Y2, whenever Y1 ⊆ Y2,
then Γ(Y1) ⊆ Γ(Y2).
We define the class inductively defined by Φ to be the smallest Φ-closed class. The main result about
inductively defined classes states that this class, denoted I(Φ), always exists.
Lemma 4.4 (CZF) (Class Inductive Definition Theorem) For any inductive definition Φ there is a smallest
Φ-closed class I(Φ).
Proof. [2], section 4.2 or [4], Theorem 5.1. ✷
Lemma 4.5 (CZF+REA) If A is a set and Bx is a set for all x ∈ A, then Wa∈ABa is a set.
Proof. This follows from [3], Corollary 5.3. ✷
Lemma 4.6 (CZF)
There exists a smallest ΠΣ-closed class, i.e., a smallest class Y such that the following hold:
(i) n ∈ Y for all n ∈ ω;
(ii) ω ∈ Y;
(iii)
∏
x∈ABx ∈ Y and
∑
x∈ABx ∈ Y whenever A ∈ Y and Bx ∈ Y for all x ∈ A.
Likewise, there exists a smallest ΠΣI-closed class, i.e. a smallest class Y∗, which, in addition to the closure
conditions (i)–(iii) above, satisfies:
(iv) I(A, a, b) ∈ Y∗ whenever A ∈ Y∗ and a, b ∈ A.
Proof. [55, Lemma 2.8]. ⊓⊔
Definition 4.7 The ΠΣ-generated sets are the sets in the smallest ΠΣ-closed class. Similarly one defines
the ΠΣI, ΠΣW and ΠΣWI-generated sets.
A set P is a base if for any P -indexed family (Xa)a∈P of inhabited sets Xa, there exists a function f with
domain P such that, for all a ∈ P , f(a) ∈ Xa.
ΠΣ−AC is the statement that every ΠΣ-generated set is a base. Similarly one defines the axioms
ΠΣI−AC, ΠΣWI−AC, and ΠΣW−AC.
The presentation axiom, PAx, states that every set is the surjective image of a base.
Lemma 4.8
(i) (CZF) ΠΣ−AC and ΠΣI−AC are equivalent.
(ii) (CZF+REA) ΠΣW−AC and ΠΣWI−AC are equivalent.
Proof. [55, 2.12]. ⊓⊔
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4.2 Large sets in constructive set theory
Large cardinals play a central role in modern set theory. This section deals with large cardinal properties
in the context of intuitionistic set theories. Since in intuitionistic set theory ∈ is not a linear ordering on
ordinals the notion of a cardinal does not play a central role. Consequently, one talks about “ large set
properties” instead of “ large cardinal properties”. When stating these properties one has to proceed rather
carefully. Classical equivalences of cardinal notion might no longer prevail in the intuitionistic setting, and
one therefore wants to choose a rendering which intuitionistically retains the most strength. On the other
hand certain notions have to be avoided so as not to imply excluded third. To give an example, cardinal
notions like measurability, supercompactness and hugeness have to be expressed in terms of elementary
embeddings rather than ultrafilters.
We shall, however, not concern ourselves with very large cardinals here and rather restrict attention to the
very first notions of largeness introduced by Hausdorff and Mahlo, that is, inaccessible and Mahlo sets and
the pertaining hierarchies of inaccessible and Mahlo sets.
We have already seen one notion of largeness, namely that of a regular set. In ZFC, a regular set which
itself is a model of the axioms of CZF is of the form Vκ with κ a strongly inaccessible cardinal.
6 In the
context of CZF this notion is much weaker.
Definition 4.9 If A is a transitive set and φ is a formula with parameters in A we denote by φA the
formula which arises from φ by replacing all unbounded quantifiers ∀u and ∃v in φ by ∀u ∈ A and ∃v ∈ A,
respectively.
We can view any transitive set A as a structure equipped with the binary relation ∈A = {〈x, y〉 | x ∈ y ∈
A}. A set-theoretic sentence whose parameters lie in A, then has a canonical interpretation in (A,∈A) by
interpreting ∈ as ∈A, and (A,∈A) |= φ is logically equivalent to φ
A. We shall usually write A |= φ in place
of φA.
A set I is said to be weakly inaccessible if I is a regular set such that I |= CZF−, where CZF− denotes the
theory CZF bereft of the set induction scheme.7
The strong regular extension axiom, sREA, states that every set is an element of a weakly inaccessible set.
There is a more ‘algebraic’ way of expressing weak inaccessibility. Stating it requires some definitions.
Definition 4.10 For sets A,B we denote by mv(AB) the collection of all full relations from A to B, i.e.,
of those relations R ⊆ A × B such that ∀x ∈ A∃y ∈ B 〈x, y〉 ∈ R. A set C is said to be full in mv(AB) if
for all R ∈mv(AB) there exists R′ ∈mv(AB) such that R′ ⊆ R and R′ ∈ C.
For a set A, define
∧
A to be the set {x ∈ 1 | ∀u ∈ Ax ∈ u}, where 1 = {∅}.
Proposition 4.11 (CZF−) A set I is weakly inaccessible if and only if I is a regular set such that the
following are satisfied:
1. ω ∈ I,
2. ∀a ∈ I
⋃
a ∈ I,
3. ∀a ∈ I [a inhabited →
⋂
a ∈ I],
4. ∀A,B ∈ I ∃C ∈ I C is full in mv(AB).
Proof : [5, 10.26].
We will consider two stronger notions.
Definition 4.12 A set I is called inaccessible if I is weakly inaccessible and for all x ∈ I there exists a
regular set y ∈ I such that x ∈ y.
A set M is said to be Mahlo if M is inaccessible and for every R ∈ mv(MM) there exists an inaccessible
I ∈M such that
∀x ∈ I ∃y ∈ I 〈x, y〉 ∈ R.
6Note that CZF with classical logic is the same theory as ZF.
7 Note that if the background set theory validates set induction for ∆0 formulae then a transitive set will be automatically
a model of the full set induction scheme, and thus a regular set I will satisfy I |= CZF.
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4.3 Fragments of second order arithmetic
The proof-theoretic strength of theories is commonly calibrated using standard theories and their canonical
fragments. In classical set theory this linear line of consistency strengths is couched in terms of large cardinal
axioms while for weaker theories the line of reference systems traditionally consist of subsystems of second
order arithmetic. The observation that large chunks of mathematics can already be formalized in fragments
of second order arithmetic goes back to Hilbert and Bernays [31], and has led to a systematic research
program known as Reverse Mathematics. Below we give an account of the syntax of L2 and frequently
considered axiomatic principles.
Definition 4.13 The language L2 of second-order arithmetic contains number variables x, y, z, u, . . ., set
variables X,Y, Z, U, V,A,B,C, . . . (ranging over subsets of N), the constant 0, function symbols Suc,+, ·,
and relation symbols =, <,∈. Suc stands for the successor function. We write x+ 1 for Suc(x). Terms are
built up as usual. For n ∈N, let n¯ be the canonical term denoting n. Formulae are built from the prime
formulae s = t, s < t, and s ∈ X using ∧,∨,¬, ∀x, ∃x, ∀X and ∃X where s, t are terms. Note that equality
in L2 is only a relation on numbers. However, equality of sets will be considered a defined notion, namely
X = Y if and only if ∀x[x∈X ↔ x∈Y ]. As per usual, number quantifiers are called bounded if they occur
in the context ∀x(x < s→ . . .) or ∃x(x < s∧ . . .) for a term s which does not contain x. The Σ00-formulae are
those formulae in which all quantifiers are bounded number quantifiers. For k > 0, Σ0k-formulae are formulae
of the form ∃x1∀x2 . . . Qxkφ, where φ is Σ00; Π
0
k-formulae are those of the form ∀x1∃x2 . . . Qxkφ. The union
of all Π0k- and Σ
0
k-formulae for all k ∈ N is the class of arithmetical or Π
0
∞-formulae. The Σ
1
k-formulae
(Π1k-formulae) are the formulae ∃X1∀X2 . . .QXkφ (resp. ∀X1∃X2 . . . Qxkφ) for arithmetical φ.
The basic axioms in all theories of second-order arithmetic are the defining axioms of 0, 1,+, ·, < and the
induction axiom
∀X(0 ∈ X ∧ ∀x(x ∈ X → x+ 1 ∈ X)→ ∀x(x ∈ X)),
respectively the scheme of induction
IND φ(0) ∧ ∀x(φ(x)→ φ(x + 1))→ ∀xφ(x),
where φ is an arbitrary L2-formula. We consider the axiom scheme of C-comprehension for formula classes
C which is given by
C-CA ∃X∀u(u ∈ X ↔ φ(u))
for all formulae φ ∈ C (of course, X must not be free in φ).
For each axiom scheme Ax we denote by (Ax) the theory consisting of the basic arithmetical axioms, the
scheme Π0∞-CA, the scheme of induction and the scheme Ax. If we replace the scheme of induction by the
induction axiom, we denote the resulting theory by (Ax)0. An example for these notations is the theory
(Π11-CA) which contains the induction scheme, whereas (Π
1
1-CA)0 only contains the induction axiom in
addition to the comprehension scheme for Π11-formulae.
In the basic system one can introduce defined symbols for all primitive recursive functions. Especially, let
〈,〉 : N × N −→ N be a primitive recursive and bijective pairing function. The xth section of U is defined
by Ux := {y : 〈x, y〉 ∈ U}. Observe that a set U is uniquely determined by its sections on account of 〈,〉’s
bijectivity. Any set R gives rise to a binary relation ≺R defined by y ≺R x := 〈y, x〉 ∈ R. Using this coding
we can formulate the C-axiom of choice scheme for formula classes C which is given by
C-AC ∀x∃Y ψ(x, Y )→ ∃Z ∀uψ(x, Zx),
for all formulae ψ ∈ C (Z must not be free in ψ).
Another important principle is Bar induction:
BI ∀X
[
WF(≺X) ∧ ∀u
(
∀v ≺X uφ(v)→ φ(u)
)
→ ∀uφ(u)
]
for all formulae φ, whereWF(≺X) expresses that ≺X is well-founded, i.e., WF(≺X) stands for the formula
∀Y
[
∀u
[
(∀v ≺X u v ∈ Y ) → u ∈ Y
]
→ ∀u u ∈ Y
]
.
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Universes in type theory (withW -types) bear a strong relation to β-models which are models of the language
of L2 or set theory for which the notion well-foundedness is absolute.
Definition 4.14 Any set A of natural numbers gives rise to a set XA := {Ai | i ∈ N} of sets of natural
numbers. A is said to be a β-model if the L2-structure
A := (N,XA, 0, 1,+, ·,∈)
is a β-model, i.e., A |= Π0∞-CA, and whenever Y ∈ XA and A |=WF(≺Y ) then ≺Y is well-founded.
Obviously, the notion, the notion of β-model can be expressed in L2.
An intuitionistic L2-theory. There is an interesting version of second order arithmetic, which will be
used in theory reductions, that classically has the same strength as full second order arithmetic, (Π1∞-CA),
but when based on intuitionistic logic is of the same strength as Ti0.
Definition 4.15 IARI is a theory in the language of second order arithmetic. The logical rules of IARI
are those of intuitionistic second order arithmetic. In addition to the usual axioms for intuitionistic second
order logic, axioms are (the universal closures of):
1. Induction:
φ(0) ∧ ∀n[φ(n)→ φ(n+ 1)]→ ∀nφ(n)
for all formulae φ.
2. Arithmetic Comprehension Schema:
∃X∀n[n ∈ X ↔ ψ(x)]
for ψ arithmetical (parameters allowed).
3. Replacement:
∀X [∀n ∈ X∃ !Y φ(n, Y )→ ∃Z∀n ∈ X φ(n, Zn)]
for all formulas φ. Here φ(n, Zn) arises from φ(n, Z) by replacing each occurrence t ∈ Z in the formula
by 〈n, t〉 ∈ Z.
4. Inductive Generation:
∀U∀X∃Y
[
WPU (X,Y ) ∧ (∀n[∀k(k ≺X n→ φ(k))→ φ(n)]→ ∀m ∈ Y φ(m))
]
,
for all formulas φ, where k ≺X n abbreviates 〈k, n〉 ∈ X and WPU (X,Y ) stands for
ProgU (X,Y ) ∧ ∀Z[ProgU (X,Z)→ Y ⊆ Z]
with ProgU (X,Y ) being ∀n ∈ U [∀k(k ≺X n→ k ∈ Y )→ n ∈ Y ].
Remark 4.16 (IARI) Note that WPU (X,Y ) and WPU (X,Y
′) imply Y = Y ′, i.e. ∀n(n ∈ Y ↔ n ∈ Y ′).
Therefore, if WPU (X,Y ), then
∀n ∈ U [∀k ≺X nφ(k)→ φ(n)]→ ∀m ∈ Y φ(m)
holds for all formulae φ.
The latter principle will be referred to as “ induction over the well–founded part of ≺X” . In the rest of this
section we shall write WF(U,X) for the (extensionally) uniquely determined Y which satisfies WPU (X,Y ).
The main tool for performing the well-ordering proof of [34] in IARI is the following principle of transfinite
recursion.
Proposition 4.17 (IARI) If WPU (X,Y ) and ∀n ∈ Y ∀W∃!V ψ(n,W, V ), then there exists Z such that
∀n∈Y ψ(n,
⋃
{(Z)k : k ≺X n}, (Z)n).
Proof : See [48, 6.4]. ⊓⊔
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5 On relating theories I
The first result relates intuitionistic explicit mathematics to constructive set theory and a fragment of
MLTT. Let MLT1WV be the fragment of MLTT with only one universe U0 where the W-constructor can
solely be applied to families of types in U0 but one can also form the type V := W(A:U0)A (something that
could be called the type of Brouwer ordinals of U0). We shall also consider the type theory MLT1W which
is the fragment of MLT1WV without the type V.
A principle of omniscience. Certain basic principles of classical mathematics are taboo for the construc-
tive mathematician. Bishop called them principles of omniscience. The limited principle of omniscience,
LPO, is an instance of the law of excluded middle which usually serves as a line of demarcation, separating
“constructive” from “non-constructive” theories. In the case of CZF, adding the law of excluded middle
even just for atomic statements of the form a ∈ b results in an enormous increase in proof strength, pushing
it up beyond that of Zermelo set theory. However, LPO can be added to CZF without affecting its proof-
theoretic strength. LPO has the pleasant side effect that one can carry out elementary analysis pretty much
in the same way as in any standard text book.
Definition 5.1 Let 2N be Cantor space, i.e the set of all functions from the naturals into {0, 1}. Limited
Principle of Omniscience (LPO):
∀f ∈ 2N [∃n f(n) = 1 ∨ ∀n f(n) = 0].
Theorem 5.2 The following theories have the same proof-theoretic strength and therefore prove (as a min-
imum) the same Π02 statements of arithmetic:
(i) Intuitionistic explicit mathematics, Ti0.
(ii) Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Regular Extension Axiom, CZF+REA.
(iii) Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory augmented by RDC and the strong Regular Extension Ax-
iom, CZF+ sREA+RDC.
(iv) CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx.
(v) The extensional type theory MLText1WV.
(vi) MLT1WV.
(vii) The extensional type theory MLText1W .
(viii) MLT1W .
(ix) The classical subsystem of second order arithmetic (Σ12-AC) +BI (same as (∆
1
2-CA) +BI).
(x) The intuitionistic system IARI of second order arithmetic.
(xi) Classical Kripke-Platek set theory,KP (cf. [7], plus the axiom asserting that every set is contained in
an admissible set. (This theory is often denoted by KPi.)
(xii) Intuitionistic Kripke-Platek set theory, IKP, plus the axiom asserting that every set is contained in an
admissible set. (This theory will be notated by IKPi.)
(xiii) CZF+REA+RDC+ LPO.
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Proof : The equivalence of (i),(ii),(iii),(iv),(v),(vi),(vii),(viii),(ix),(x), and (xi) follows from [48], Theorem
3.9, Proposition 5.3, Theorem 5.13 and Theorem 6.13 plus the extra observation that the interpretation of
IRA in MLText1W defined in [48, Definition 6.5] and proved to be an interpretation in [48, Theorem 6.9]
actually only requires the intensional identity type. It was already observed by Palmgren [46] that the
interpretations of theories of iterated, strictly positive inductive definitions in type theory works with the
intensional identity, and the same argument applies here.
The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) follows from [52, Theorem 4.7], where the principle sREA is denoted by
INAC.
The proof-theoretic equivalence of (xi) and (xii) follows since the intuitionistic version is a subtheory of the
classical one and the well-ordering proof for initial segments of the ordinal of KPi can already be carried
out in the intuitionistic theory.
For (xiii) we rely on [61]. That the theory CZF+REA+RDC+LPO has a realizability interpretation in
(Σ12-AC) +BI follows by an extension of the techniques used in [61, Theorem 6.2]. The proof furnished a
realizability model forCZF+RDC+LPO that is based on recursion in the type-2 object E : (N → N)→ N
with E(f) = n + 1 if f(n) = 0 and ∀i < n f(n) > 0 and E(f) = 0 if ∀n f(n) > 0. Recursion in E
is formalizable in the theory of bar induction, i.e. (Π0∞-CA) + BI, which is known to have the same
strength as CZF (see [61, Theorem 2.2]). The same recursion theory (or partial combinatory algebra) can
be employed in extending the modeling of a type structure given in [61, §5] to the larger type structure
needed for CZF+REA+RDC+LPO. This is achieved by basically taking the type structure in [48, 5.8]
but changing the underlying partial combinatory algebra to the one obtained from recursion in the type two
object E rather than the usual one provided by the partial recursive functions on N.
It is very likely that the interpretation also validates ΠΣW-AC and PAx, but this hasn’t yet been checked.
At any rate, we have shown the proof-theoretic equivalence of all theories. ⊓⊔
The foregoing proof establishes the claimed results, however, we’d like to look at Theorem 5.2 in more detail,
especially at its proof(s) and the information one can extract from it.
For starters, what does the phrase “same proof-theoretic strength” mean? At a minimum it means that
the theories ought to be finitistically equiconsistent. Here it means that they prove at least the same Π02
statements of the language of first-order arithmetic. But more can be shown. A result we will be working
toward is that many of the intuitionistic theories of Theorem 5.2 prove the same arithmetical statements. In
particular it will be shown that the extensional and the intensional type theories prove the same arithmetical
statements. An arithmetical statement gives rise to a type via the propositions-as-types paradigm, so by
conservativity of one type theory over another with respect to arithmetic statements we mean that the same
arithmetical types are provably inhabited in both theories.
The question of the relation between intensional and extensional type theories has been addressed before by
Hofmann in [32]. The set-up there, though, is somewhat different in that the intensional type theory TTI of
[32] is not a pure intensional type theory. It has two extensional rules called functional extensionality and
uniqueness of identity:
(ID-UNI-I)
Γ ⊢ s : A Γ ⊢ p : Id(A, s, s)
Γ ⊢ IdUni(A, s, p) : Id(Id(A, s, s), p, refl(s))
(EXT-FORM)
Γ ⊢ f, g : Π(x :A)B(x) Γ, x : A ⊢ p(x) : Id(B(x), fx, gx)
Γ ⊢ Ext(f, g, p) : Id(Π(x :A)B(x), f, g) .
These rules are not provable in the purely intensional context, so as a result, we are pursuing a different
question here.
Proposition 5.3 Ti0 can be interpreted in CZF +REA. The interpretation preserves (at least) all arith-
metic statements.
Proof : The proof of [48] Theorem 3.9 provides an interpretation of Ti0 in CZF+REA which is essentially a
class model of Ti0 inside CZF+REA. Having defined an applicative structure, the classifications are defined
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inductively along the (intuitionistic) ordinals. This is inspired by Feferman’s construction of a model of Ti0
in [20, Theorem 4.1.1]. Inspection of the translation confirms that arithmetic statements get preserved. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5.4 (i) CZF+REA has an interpretation in MLT1WV.
(ii) CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx has an interpretation in MLText1WV.
Proof : (i) and (ii) follow from [3]. The interpretation uses the type V and two propositional functions
=˙ : V × V→ U0
∈˙ : V × V→ U0
to interpret = and ∈. For (i), the identity type does not play any role. For (ii) one needs the extensionality
of function types. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5.5 CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx is conservative over CZF+REA+FT-AC
for statements of finite type arithmetic (i.e., of the language of HAω).
Proof : From [55, Theorem 5.23] it follows that CZF + REA +ΠΣW-AC + RDC + PAx and CZF +
REA + ΠΣW-AC prove the same sentences of finite type arithmetic (and more) since the inner model
H(Y∗
W
) satisfies CZF + REA + ΠΣW-AC + RDC + PAx, assuming CZF + REA + ΠΣW-AC in the
background.
By [54, Theorem 4.33], there is an interpretation of CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC in CZF+REA. Inspection
shows that, in the presence of FT-AC, the meanings of statements of finite type arithmetic are preserved
under this interpretation. ⊓⊔
Proposition 5.6 For θ a sentence of arithmetic let ‖θ‖ be the corresponding type term according to the
propositions-as-types translation. If
MLText1WV ⊢ t : ‖θ‖
for some term t, then
CZF+REA+ FT-AC ⊢ θset
with θset denoting the standard set-theoretic rendering of θ.
Proof : Assume MLText1WV ⊢ t : ‖θ‖. The interpretation
∧ of MLText1WV into CZF+REA given in [55, §6]
yields CZF + REA ⊢ (t : ‖θ‖)∧. Inspection shows that (t : ‖θ‖)∧ is a statement about the finite type
structure over ω. One then sees, with the help of FT-AC, that θset holds. This is similar to the proof of
[55, Theorem 3.15]. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5.7 CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx is conservative over
IKP+ ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is an admissible set]
for arithmetical statements.
Proof : We shall use the shorthand IKPi for the latter theory. By Proposition 5.5 it suffices to show that
CZF + REA + FT-AC is conservative over IKPi for arithmetic statements. [48, Theorem 5.11] shows
that MLText1WV has an interpretation in the classical theory KPi where types are interpreted as subsets of
ω and crucially dependent products of types are interpreted as sets of indices of partial recursive functions.
This also furnishes an interpretation of CZF + REA + FT-AC in KPi since the former is interpretable
in MLText1WV. The interpretation also works for IKPi as definition by (transfinite) Σ-recursion works in
intuitionistic KP as well (see [4, Sec. 11] and [5, Sec. 19]). The inductive definition of 5.8 in [48] proceeds
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along the ordinals and focusses on successor ordinals, seemingly requiring a classical case distinction as to
whether an ordinal is a successor or a limit or 0, but this is actually completely irrelevant.
Now, the upshot of this hereditarily recursive interpretation is that every Π02 theorem of CZF + REA +
FT-AC is provable in IKPi. To be able to extend this approach to all of arithmetic, one needs a more
abstract type structure such that interpretability entails deducibility. The conservativity of HAω +FT-AC
over HA, due to Goodman [27, 28], provides the template. The two steps of Goodman’s second proof
have been neatly separated by Beeson [9] to construct a general methodology for showing an intuitionistic
theory T to be conservative over another theory S for arithmetic statements. The idea is to combine two
interpretations, where the first uses functions that are recursive relative to a generic oracle and the second
step is a forcing construction. The same idea has been used by Gordeev [29], and in more recent times by
Chen and Rathjen in [14, 15, 62], establishing several conservativity results.
The oracle O will be a fixed but arbitrary partial function from N to {0, 1}. A partial function φ is recursive
relative to O if it is given by a Turing machine with access to O. During a computation the oracle may
be consulted about the value of O(n) for several n. If O(n) is defined it will return that value and the
computation will continue, but if O(n) is not defined no response will be coming forward and the computation
will never come to a halt. The idea of the second interpretation step is that on account of O’s arbitrariness it
can be interpreted in many ways. Given an arithmetic statement θ, an oracle Oθ can be engineered so that
in a forcing model realizability of θ with functions computable relative to Oθ entails the truth of θ. The final
step, then, is achieved by noticing that for arithmetic statements forcibility (where the forcing conditions
are finite partial functions on N) and validity coincide. For details we’ll have to refer to [14, 15]. ⊓⊔
Definition 5.8 Below we shall speak about arithmetical statements in various theories with differing lan-
guages. There is a canonical translation of the language of first and second order arithmetic into the language
of set theory. However, it is perhaps less obvious what arithmetical statements mean in the context of type
theory.
The terms of the language of HA are to be translated in an obvious way, crucially using the type-theoretic
recursor for the type N. In this way each term t of HA gets assigned a raw term tˆ of type theory. For details
see [42, pp. 71–75], [8, XI.17] [70, Ch. 11, Sect. 2]. An equation s = t of the language HA is translated as
a type-expression Id(N, sˆ, tˆ). For complex formulas the translation proceeds in the obvious way.
We then say that two type theories TT1 and TT2 prove the same arithmetical statements if for all sentences
A of HA,
TT1 ⊢ p : Aˆ for some p iff TT2 ⊢ p
′ : Aˆ for some p′,
where Aˆ denotes the type-theoretic translation of A.
Recall that IKPi is the theory IKP+ ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is an admissible set].
Theorem 5.9 The following theories prove the same arithmetical statements, i.e. statements of the language
of first order arithmetic (also known as Peano arithmetic).
(i) Ti0.
(ii) CZF+REA.
(iii) CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx.
(iv) MLText1WV.
(v) MLT1WV.
(vi) MLText1W.
(vii) MLT1W.
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(viii) IARI.
(ix) IKPi.
Proof : Let θ be an arithmetic sentence. Then we have
Ti0 ⊢ θ ⇒ CZF+REA ⊢ θ
⇒ CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx ⊢ θ
⇒ IKPi ⊢ θ
by Proposition 5.3 and Theorem 5.7. Now it follows from Ja¨ger’s article [34] and from [36] that every initial
segment of the proof-theoretic ordinal of IKPi is provably well-founded in Ti0, and thus, if IKPi ⊢ θ, then
Ti0 is sufficient to show that there is an infinite intuitionistic cut-free proof of θ. By induction on the length
of the proof it then follows that all sequents in the proof are true, yielding that Ti0 ⊢ θ. The upshot is that
the theories of (i), (ii) and (iii) prove the same arithmetic statements. Furthermore, if MLText1WV ⊢ t : ‖θ‖
for some term t, then CZF+REA ⊢ θ by Proposition 5.6 and hence Ti0 ⊢ θ.
So to finish the proof it would suffice to show that Ti0 ⊢ θ yields MLT1WV ⊢ s : ‖θ‖ for some term s. Now
[48, Sec. 6] shows that the intuitionistic theory IARI has the same proof-theoretic ordinal as IKPi and Ti0.
So from Ti0 ⊢ θ it follows that IARI ⊢ θ. By [48, Theorem 6.9] we then get MLT1WV ⊢ s : ‖θ‖ for some
term s, completing the circle. ⊓⊔
Remark 5.10 Ordinal analysis played a crucial role in the proofs of Theorems 5.2 and 5.9. Having the same
proof-theoretic ordinal allowed us to infer that Ti0, IKPi and IARI prove the same arithmetic statements.
For a long time [34] was also the only proof that enabled one to reduce the classical theories (∆12-CA) + BI
and KPi to classical T0. There is now also a proof by Sato [65] for the reductions in the classical case that
avoids proof-theoretic ordinals. However, determining the strength of other important fragments of MLTT
(such as the ones analyzed by Setzer in [66]) still requires the techniques of ordinal analysis.
The strength of other important fragments of MLTT was analyzed by Setzer in [66].
Remark 5.11 We conjecture that also the theory CZF+ sREA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx (or at least
CZF+sREA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC) proves the same arithmetical statements as any of the theories featuring
in Theorem 5.9. As the latter relies on a substantial number of results from the literature, several of them
would have to be revisited and possibly amended to establish this.
6 On relating theories II: MLTT and friends
So far we have only gathered results concerning theories that are of the strength of Martin-Lo¨f type theory
with one universe. The earlier quote by Harris speculated on the strength of type theory with infinitely
many universes. As it turns out, similar techniques can be applied in this context as well.
To begin with, we shall define versions of explicit mathematics, second order arithmetic and constructive set
theory featuring analogues of universes.
6.1 Ti0 with universes.
Definition 6.1 Systems of explicit mathematics with universes have been defined and studied in several
papers (cf. [37, 38, 39]) and were probably first introduced by Feferman [23].
By Ti0 +
⋃
n Un we denote an extension of T
i
0 whose language has infinitely many classification constants
U0,U1, . . . and the following axioms for each constant Un.
1. N ε Un and Ui ε Un for i < n.
2. ∀x ε Un ∃X x = X (i.e. every element of Un is a classification).
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3. For every elementary formula ψ(x,~v,X1, . . . , Xr) with all classification variables exhibited and which
does not contain constants Ui with i ≥ n,
∀X1, . . . , Xr ε Un ∃Y [Y ε Un ∧ Y ≃ {x : ψ(x,~v,X1, . . . , Xr)}] .
4. ∀X ε Un [∀x ε X ∃Y ε Un fx ≃ Y → ∃Z[Z ∈ Un ∧ Z ≃ j(X, f)]].
5. ∀X,Y ε Un ∃Z [Z ∈ Un ∧ Z ≃ i(X,Y )].
In other words, a classification Un is a universe containing N,U0, . . . ,Un−1 closed under elementary com-
prehension, join and inductive generation.
By Ti0 +
⋃
i<n Ui we denote the theory with just the universes U0, . . . ,Un−1 and their pertaining axioms.
6.2 Universes in intuitionistic second order arithmetic.
It is also useful to have a many universes version of IARI to obtain an intuitionistic theory of second order
arithmetic which can be easily interpreted in MLTT. One idea would be to adopt the notion of β-model
from Definition 4.14 to serve as a notion of universe. However, a β-model comes with an explicit countable
enumeration of its sets and therefore it would be difficult if not impossible to model such structures in
MLTT. Instead, an option is to add set predicates U0,U1, . . . to the language L2 that are intended to apply
to sets of natural numbers with the aim of singling out collections of sets that have universe-like properties.
Definition 6.2 The theory IARI+
⋃
n Un has additional predicates U0,U1, . . . for creating new atomic for-
mulas Un(X) (n ∈ N), where X is a second order variable. We use abbreviations like ∀X ∈ Un ϕ and
∃X ∈ Un ϕ for ∀X (Un(X) → ϕ) and ∃X (Un(X) ∧ ϕ), respectively. If ψ is any formula of this language,
then ψUn arises from ψ by relativizing all second order quantifiers to Un, i.e., replacing all quantifiers QX
in ψ by QX ∈ Un.
In addition to the axioms of IARI there are the following pertaining to the new predicates.
1. The predicates Un are cumulative, i.e. ∀X [Ui(X)→ Uj(X)] whenever i ≤ j.
2. Induction:
φ(0) ∧ ∀u[φ(u)→ φ(u + 1)]→ ∀uφ(u)
for all formulae φ.
3. Arithmetic Comprehension Schema for Un:
Y1, . . . , Yr ∈ Un → ∃X ∈ Un∀u[u ∈ X ↔ ψ(u, Y1, . . . , Yr)]
if ψ(u, Y1, . . . , Yr) is a formula with all free second order variables exhibited, in which all second order
quantifiers are of the form QX ∈ Ui for some i < n, and moreover, no predicates Uj for j ≥ n occur in
it.
4. Replacement:
∀X ∈ Un[∀u ∈ X∃ !Y ∈ Unφ(u, Y )→ ∃Z ∈ Un∀u ∈ X φ(u, Zu)]
for all formulas φ. Here φ(u, Zu) arises from φ(u, Z) by replacing each occurrence t ∈ Z in the formula
by 〈u, t〉 ∈ Z.
5. Inductive Generation:
∀U ∈ Un∀X ∈ Un∃Y ∈ Un
[
WPU (X,Y ) ∧ (∀u[∀v(v ≺X u→ φ(v))→ φ(u)]→ ∀x ∈ Y φ(x))
]
,
for all formulas φ, where v ≺X u abbreviates 〈v, u〉 ∈ X and WPU (X,Y ) stands for
ProgU (X,Y ) ∧ ∀Z[ProgU (X,Z)→ Y ⊆ Z]
with ProgU (X,Y ) being ∀y ∈ U [∀z(z ≺X y → z ∈ Y )→ y ∈ Y ].
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By IARI +
⋃
i<m Ui we denote the theory with only the additional predicates U0, . . . ,Um−1 and their
pertaining axioms.
Definition 6.3 Recall the notion of inaccessible set defined in 4.12. For n > 0, Inacc(n) stands for the
set-theoretic statement that there are n-many inaccessible sets I0 ∈ . . . ∈ In−1. Inacc(0) stands for 0 = 0.
β-models were introduced in 4.14. By Beta(n) we denote the statement of second order arithmetic asserting
that there are n many sets A0, . . . , An−1 which are β-models of Σ
1
2-AC such that A0 ∈ . . . ∈ An−1, where
for sets X,Y of natural numbers X ∈ Y is defined by ∃u X = Yu.
For n > 0, let MLTnWV be the fragment of MLTT with n-many universes U0, . . . ,Un−1, where the W-
constructor can solely be applied to families of types in U0, . . . ,Un−1 but one can also form the type V :=
W(A:Un−1)A, i.e. a W-type over the largest universe Un−1. We shall also consider the type theory MLTnW
which is the fragment of MLTnWV without the type V.
Below we assume that n > 0.
Theorem 6.4 (i) Ti0 +
⋃
i<n Ui has an interpretation in CZF + REA + Inacc(n). The interpretation
preserves (at least) all arithmetic statements.
(ii) CZF+REA+ Inacc(n− 1) has an interpretation in MLTnWV.
(iii) CZF+REA+ Inacc(n− 1) +ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx has an interpretation in MLTextnWV.
(iv) MLTextnWV has an interpretation in the classical set theory KPi plus an axiom asserting that there exist
n− 1-many recursively inaccessible ordinals.
(v) (Σ12-AC) + BI + Beta(n) has an interpretation in KPi plus the existence of n-many recursively
inaccessible ordinals.
(vi) KPi plus the existence of n-many recursively inaccessible ordinals has a sets-as-trees interpretation in
(Σ12-AC) +BI+Beta(n).
(vii) The intuitionistic system IRA+
⋃
i<n−1 Ui of second order arithmetic can be interpreted in MLTnW.
(viii) CZF+REA+RDC+Inacc(n) has a realizability interpretation in KPi plus the existence of n-many
recursively inaccessible ordinals.
(ix) All the above theories have the same proof-theoretic strength and prove (at least) the same Π02-statements
of arithmetic.
Proof : The interpretations are extensions of those discussed in the previous section, taking more universes
into account. We can only indicate the steps. The interpretation of Ti0 in CZF+REA can be lifted to an
interpretation of Ti0 +
⋃
i<n Ui into CZF +REA + Inacc(n). The latter theory possesses a sets-as-types
interpretation in intensional Martin-Lo¨f type theory with n+ 1 universes.
CZF+REA+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx+Inacc(n−1) possesses a sets-as-types interpretation inMLTextnWV.
In turn,MLTextnWV can be interpreted in classical Kripke-Platek set theoryKPi plus an axiom asserting that
there are at least n − 1-many recursively inaccessible ordinals, following the Ansatz of [48, Theorem 5.11].
(Σ12-AC) +BI+Beta(n) can be easily interpreted in KPi plus n-recursively inaccessible ordinals.
The proof-theoretic equivalence ensues from an ordinal analysis of the ‘top theory’, KPi plus the existence
of n-many recursively inaccessible ordinals, together with proofs that any ordinal below the proof-theoretic
ordinal of that theory is provably well-founded inTi0+
⋃
i<n Ui as well as IARI+
⋃
i<n Ui. Neither the ordinal
analysis nor the well-ordering proofs are available from the published literature. The ordinal analysis of KPi
plus the existence of n-many recursively inaccessible ordinals, though, can be obtained in a straightforward
way by extending the one given for KPi in [36] or rather its modern version in [12]. It also follows from the
ordinal analysis of the much stronger theory KPM given in [47] by restricting the treatment therein to the
pertaining small fragments. For the well-ordering proof substantially more work is required; details will be
published in [63]. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 6.5 The following theories have the same proof-theoretic strength and prove the same Π02-statements
of arithmetic:
(i) Ti0 +
⋃
n Un.
(ii) CZF plus Inacc(n) for all n > 0.
(iii) CZF+ΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx plus Inacc(n) for all n > 0.
(iv) The extensional type theory MLTText.
(v) MLTT.
(vi) The classical subsystem of second order arithmetic (Σ12-AC) +BI plus Beta(n) for all n > 0.
(vii) Classical Kripke-Platek set theory KP plus for every n > 0 an axiom asserting that there are at least
n-many recursively inaccessible ordinals.
(viii) IARI+
⋃
n Un.
(ix) CZF+RDC+ LPO plus the axioms Inacc(n) for all n > 0.
Proof : This follows directly from the previous theorem. ⊓⊔
The latter theorem also shows that the strength ofMLTT is dwarfed by that of (Π12-CA). It corresponds to
a tiny fragment of second order arithmetic which itself is a tiny fragment of ZF, so there are aeons between
MLTT and classical set theory with inaccessible cardinals.
Theorem 6.6 The following theories prove the same arithmetical statements:
(i) Ti0 +
⋃
n Un.
(ii) MLTT.
(iii) The extensional type theory MLTText.
(iv) CZF plus Inacc(n) for every n > 0.
(v) CZF+
⋃
n Inacc(n) +
⋃
nΠΣW-AC+RDC+PAx.
(vi) IARI+
⋃
n Un.
Proof : The methods for proving this were described in the proof of 5.9. Details will appear in [63]. ⊓⊔
Finally, it should be mentioned that Martin-Lo¨f type theory with stronger universes (e.g. Mahlo universes)
has been studied by Setzer (cf. [67]).
6.3 Adding the Univalence Axiom
The quote (1) from Harris’ book [30] claimed that modeling Voevodsky’s univalence axiom (UA) requires
infinitely many inaccessible cardinals (for a definition of UA see [33, Sec. 2.10]). While the simplicial model
of type theory with univalence developed in the paper [41] by Kalpulkin, Lumsdaine and Voevodsky is indeed
carried out in a background set theory with inaccessible cardinals, it is by no means clear that the existence
or proof-theoretic strength of these objects is required for finding a model of type theory with UA. In
actuality, Bezem, Coquand and Huber in their article [10] provided a cubical model of type theory that also
validates UA. Crucially, their modeling can be carried out in a constructive background theory such as
CZF +
⋃
n Inacc(n) +
⋃
nΠΣW-AC +RDC + PAx. Thus it follows that adding UA does not increase
the strength of type theory and that no inaccessible cardinals are required. Hence in view of Theorem 6.5
we have the following result.
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Corollary 6.7 MLTT has the same proof-theoretic strength as MLTT+UA. Thus MLTT+UA shares
the same proof-theoretic strength with all theories listed in Theorem 6.5, in particular with classical Kripke-
Platek set theory KP augmented by axioms asserting that there are at least n-many recursively inaccessible
ordinals for every n > 0.
7 On relating theories III: Omitting W
The proof-theoretic strength of type theories crucially depends on the availability of inductive types and to
a much lesser extent on its universes. Relinquishing the W-type brings about an enormous collapse of proof
power (cf. [49, 50, 51]). Letting MLTT− be MLTT bereft of the W-type constructor, we arrive at a theory
no stronger than the system ATR0 of reverse mathematics (see [68, I.11]), having the famous ordinal Γ0 as
its proof-theoretic ordinal. According to Feferman’s analysis (see [24, 25]), Γ0 delineates the limit of a notion
of predicativity that only accepts the natural numbers as a completed infinity (which was first adumbrated in
Hermann Weyl’s book “Das Kontinuum” from 1918 [72]). Peter Hancock conjectured in the 1970s the ordinal
of MLTT− to be Γ0. Feferman [23] and independently Aczel (see also [1]) proved Hancock’s Conjecture.
There is also a version of CZF with inaccessible sets of strength Γ0, due to Crosilla and Rathjen [17], which
does not have set induction. Thus the set-theoretic analogue to eschewing W-types consists in leaving out
the principle of set induction. In the next theorem we denote by ATRi0 the intuitionistic version of ATR0
(see [49, Definition 4.10] for details). By CZF− we denote Constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without
set induction but with the Infinity axiom strengthened as follows:
0 ∈ ω ∧ ∀y[ y ∈ ω → y + 1 ∈ ω] (4)
∀x [ 0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x→ y + 1 ∈ x)→ ω ⊆ x] (5)
(for details see [17, Definition 2.2]). Likewise we denote byKP− the theory without the set induction scheme
but with the infinity axioms (4) and (5).
The notion of weak inaccessibility used below is the one from Definition 4.9. For n > 0 let wInacc(n) be
the statement that there exist weakly inaccessible sets x0, . . . , xn−1 such that x0 ∈ . . . ∈ xn−1.
A restricted form of RDC is ∆0-RDC: For all ∆0-formulae θ and ψ, whenever
(∀x ∈ a)
[
θ(x) → (∃y ∈ a)
(
θ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y)
)]
and b0 ∈ a ∧ φ(b0), then there exists a function f : ω → a such that f(0) = b0 and
(∀n ∈ ω)
[
θ(f(n)) ∧ ψ(f(n), f(n+ 1))
]
.
Theorem 7.1 The following theories share the same proof-theoretic strength and ordinal Γ0, and prove the
same Π02-sentences of arithmetic:
(i) MLTT−.
(ii) The extensional version of MLTT−.
(iii) ATR0.
(iv) ATRi0.
(v) CZF− + ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is weakly inaccessible] + ∆0-RDC.
(vi) CZF− + {wInacc(n) | n > 0}+RDC.
(vii) KP− + ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is admissible].
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Proof : We only have to establish that all theories have proof-theoretic ordinal Γ0. For extensionalMLTT
−
this follows from [23]. The lower bound part, namely that MLTT− has at least the strength Γ0 is due
to Jervell [40]. So we are done with (i) and (ii). That ATR0 has ordinal Γ0 is well known. For ATR
i
0
this follows from the observation in [49, Lemma 4.11] that the well ordering proof for any ordinal notation
below Γ0 uses only intuitionistic logic. The determination of the ordinal for the system in (v) and (vi) is
due to Crosilla and Rathjen [17, Corollary 9.14] with the validation of ∆0-RDC and RDC coming from
[52, Theorem 4.17] and [52, Theorem 4.16], respectively. The proof-theoretic analysis of the system in (vii)
is due to Ja¨ger [35]. ⊓⊔
We also conjecture that all of the intuitionistic theories from the above list, i.e., MLTT−, the extensional
version ofMLTT−, ATRi0, and CZF
−+∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is weakly inaccessible] prove the same arithmetic
statements using the usual techniques. But we have not yet checked that. What is known is that ATRi0
embeds in all of these theories (see [49]).
A final question concerns the status of the univalence axiom. Do we get more strength when we add UA to
MLTT−? It turns out that we just have to check whether the cubical model construction from [10] can be
carried out in one of the theories from the list. Inspection of [10] reveals that
CZF− + ∀x∃y [x ∈ y ∧ y is weakly inaccessible] + ∆0-RDC
suffices as a background theory for all the constructions, except W-types.
Corollary 7.2 The univalent type theory MLTT− +UA is of the same strength as MLTT− and ATR0
and all the other systems from Theorem 7.1. Therefore its proof-theoretic ordinal is Γ0.
8 Monotone Fixed Point Principles in Intuitionistic Explicit Math-
ematics
Martin-Lo¨f type theory appears to capture the abstract notion of an inductively defined type very well via
its W-type. There are, however, intuitionistic theories of inductive definitions that at first glance appear to
be just slight extensions of Feferman’s explicit mathematics (see Feferman’s quote from Sect. 1) but have
turned out to be much stronger than anything considered in Martin-Lo¨f type theory. They are obtained from
Ti0 by the augmentation of a monotone fixed point principle which asserts that every monotone operation
on classifications (Feferman’s notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, there are two
versions of this principle. MID merely postulates the existence of a least solution, whereas UMID provides
a uniform version of this axiom by adjoining a new functional constant to the language, ensuring that a fixed
point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation.
Definition 8.1 For extensional equality of classifications we use the shorthand “=ext”, i.e.
X =ext Y = ∀v(vεX ↔ vεY ).
Further, let X ⊆ Y be a shorthand for ∀v(vεX → vεY ). To state the monotone fixed point principle for
subclassifications of a given classification A we introduce the following shorthands:
Clop(f,A) if ∀X ⊆ A ∃Y ⊆ A fX ≃ Y
Ext(f,A) if ∀X ⊆ A ∀Y ⊆ A [X =ext Y → fX =ext fY ]
Mon(f,A) if ∀X ⊆ A ∀Y ⊆ A [X ⊆ Y → fX ⊆ fY ].
Lfp(Y, f, A) if fY ⊆ Y ∧ Y ⊆ A ∧ ∀X ⊆ A
[
fX ⊆ X → Y ⊆ X
]
When f satisfies Clop(f,A), we call f a classification operation on A. When f satisfies Clop(f,A) and
Ext(f,A), we call f extensional or an extensional operation on A. When f satisfies Clop(f,A) and
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Mon(f,A), we say that f is a monotone operation on A. Since monotonicity entails extensionality, a
monotone operation is always extensional.
Now we state UMIDA.
MIDA (Monotone Inductive Definition on A)
∀f [Clop(f,A) ∧Mon(f,A)→ ∃Y Lfp(Y, f, A)].
UMIDA (Uniform Monotone Inductive Definition on A)
∀f [Clop(f,A) ∧Mon(f,A)→ Lfp(lfp(f), f, A)].
UMIDA states that if f is monotone on subclassifications of A, then lfp(f) is a least fixed point of f .
Let V be the universe, i.e. V := {x : x = x}. By MID and UMID we denote the principles MIDV and
UMIDV , respectively.
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The strength of the various classical versions was determined as a result of several papers [56, 57, 58, 26].
The MID case is dealt with in [26, 59]. [59] provides a survey of all known results in the classical case.
UMIDN was shown to be related to subsystems of second order arithmetic based on Π
1
2 comprehension.
To relate the state of the art in these matters we shall need some terminology. Below we shall distinguish
between the classical and the intuitionistic version of a theory by appending the superscript c and i, respec-
tively. For a system S of explicit mathematics we denote by S ↾ the version wherein the induction principles
for the natural numbers and for inductive generation are restricted to sets. INDN stands for the schema of
induction on natural numbers for arbitrary formulas of the language of explicit mathematics. (Π12 −CA)0
denotes the subsystem of second order arithmetic (based on classical logic) with Π12-comprehension but with
induction restricted to sets, whereas (Π12 −CA) also contains the full schema of induction on N.
[57, 58] yielded the following results:
Theorem 8.2 (i) (Π12 −CA)0 and T
c
0
↾ +UMIDN have the same proof-theoretic strength.
(ii) (Π12 −CA) and T
c
0
↾ +INDN +UMIDN have the same proof-theoretic strength.
The first result about UMIDN on the basis of intuitionistic explicit mathematics was obtained by Tupailo
in [71].
Theorem 8.3 (Π12 −CA)0 and T
i
0
↾ +UMIDN have the same proof-theoretic strength.
[71] uses a characterization of (Π12 − CA)0 via a classical µ-calculus (a theory which extends the concept
of an inductive definition), dubbed ACA0(L
µ), given by Mo¨llerfeld [43] and then proceeds to show that
ACA0(Lµ) can be interpreted in its intuitionistic version, ACA
i
0(L
µ), by means of a double negation
translation. Finally, as the latter theory is readily interpretable in Ti0 ↾ +UMIDN, the proof-theoretic
equivalence stated in Theorem 8.3 follows in view of Theorem 8.2.
The proof of [71], however, does not generalize to Ti
0
↾ +INDN +UMIDN and extensions by further induc-
tion principles. The main reason for this is that adding induction principles such as induction on natural
numbers for all formulas to ACA0(Lµ) only slightly increases the strength of the theory and by no means
reaches the strength of (Π12−CA). In order to arrive at a µ-calculus of the strength of (Π
1
2−CA) one would
have to allow for transfinite nestings of the µ-operator of length α for any ordinal α < ε0. As it seems to be
already a considerable task to get a clean syntactic formalization of transfinite µ-calculi (let alone furnishing
double negation translation thereof), this paper will proceed along a different path. In actuality, much of
the work was already accomplished in [57], where it was shown that (Π12 −CA)0 and (Π
1
2 − CA) can be
reduced to operator theories TOP<ω and T
OP
<ε0
, respectively. A careful axiomatization of the foregoing theories
in conjunction with results from [56] showed that they lend themselves to double negation translations and
thus can be translated into their intuitionistic counterparts. As the intuitionistic theories can be easily
viewed as subtheories of Ti
0
↾ +UMIDN and T
i
0
↾ +INDN +UMIDN, respectively, one can conclude the
following result.
8The acronym for the principle MID in Feferman’s paper [21], section 7 was MIG ↾.
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Theorem 8.4 (i) (Π12 −CA)0 and T
i
0
↾ +UMIDN have the same proof-theoretic strength.
(ii) (Π12 −CA) and T
i
0
↾ +INDN +UMIDN have the same proof-theoretic strength.
Proof : See [64]. ⊓⊔
Through Theorem 8.4 one also gets a different proof of Theorem 8.3 which does not hinge upon [43].
Remark 8.5 Virtually nothing is currently known about the strength of Ti0 +MID and variants. In the
classical case there is a close relationship with parameter-free Π12-comprehension. It would be very interesting
to investigate whether the strength of MID diminishes in the intuitionistic setting.
The strength of explicit mathematics with principle like UMIDN and even MID considerably exceeds that
of Martin-Lo¨f type theory. This has a bearing on foundational questions such as the limit of constructivity
or the limits of different concepts of constructivity. In [53, 60] an attempt is made to delineate the form of
constructivism underlying Martin-Lo¨f type theory, suggesting that Ti0 +UMIDN lies beyond its scope.
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